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In many European countries, employment policies are often
framed as measures aimed at favoring particularly disadvantaged
groups in the labor market. These groups are defined in terms of
individual characteristics such as age, gender, skill, or unemploy-
ment duration, which are thought to be negatively correlated with
worker productivity. Differentiated or dual labor market policies with
different provisions for high-wage and low-wage jobs are pervasive
across the labor regulations of many countries. Thus, the higher inci-
dence of unemployment among low-skilled workers is often used to
advocate targeted employment subsidies for this group (see, for in-
stance, Drèze and Malinvaud, 1994), which have been introduced in
many countries. Payroll tax rebates for low-skilled workers and the
introduction of “atypical” employment contracts (such as part-time,
fixed-term, or seasonal contracts), which have low firing costs and
are restricted to certain groups of workers, are also very common.1
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While using two-tier schemes in reforming the labor market may
enhance political support (see Saint-Paul, 2000), the full consequences
of allowing for different employment regulations affecting different
workers in markets with heterogeneous agents are not yet fully un-
derstood. Indeed, most papers analyzing the effects of employment
policies do not take into account the targeted nature of some of those
policies.
Our intuition on the importance of the targeted nature of some
employment policies stems from our previous work on labor markets
with two-sided heterogeneity in jobs and workers. In labor markets
with heterogeneous workers searching for jobs that may be occupied
by workers of different skills, the turnover rate of one type of worker
affects the overall labor market tightness and, hence, the flows in
and out of unemployment for all workers.2 We explore these ideas in
an earlier paper (Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno, 2003), in which we
consider a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity (complex
and simple jobs and low- and high-skilled workers). In the model,
high-skilled workers can be mismatched (that is, they can work in
simple jobs), and, if they are, they engage in on-the-job search for
better jobs.3 We show that, when job requirements and workers’ skills
are heterogeneous, differentiated firing costs may reduce equilibrium
unemployment. The intuition for this result is that the mismatch of
high-skilled workers implies a negative externality of on-the-job seek-
ers on low-skilled workers when both types of workers are equally
productive in simple jobs: because mismatched workers have a higher
quit rate than low-skilled workers, they make those jobs more un-
stable and thus reduce the profits of firms opening them, leading to a
lower job creation rate.4 Alternatively, firms opening simple vacan-
cies will be less eager to do so in the presence of on-the-job search,
and this will worsen the employment prospects of less productive
workers who can only work in simple jobs. To the extent that larger
firing costs for workers in complex jobs reduces workers’ turnover in
this type of job, the size of the negative externality will also decrease,
2. Labor market tightness is defined as the ratio between the number of
vacancies and the number of workers searching for a job (namely, the unem-
ployed) in models without on-the-job search and as the ratio between the number
of vacancies and the number of unemployed workers plus mismatched workers in
models with on-the-job search.
3. Low-skilled workers cannot perform complex jobs.
4. There is also a positive externality on the supply of unskilled vacancies,
however, since more workers are looking for those jobs. The negative externality
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leading to a larger supply of simple jobs. Indeed, it is possible to con-
struct examples in which skill-biased technological change in the pres-
ence of targeted employment protection legislation may end up
reducing skill mismatch by so much that the unemployment rate of
both types of workers falls.5
In this paper, we extend some of the previous ideas to focus the
discussion on the effects of targeted employment policies. Again, we
envisage a labor market with worker heterogeneity and imperfect
substitution of workers with different skills to perform a single type
of job. Workers can be hired under different types of contract subject
to different firing costs or employment subsidies. In this setup, as
discussed above, workers’ flows and job reallocation depend on the
overall labor market tightness, so that any measure, whether tar-
geted or not, affects the employment outcomes of all workers. Our
aim here is to identify the main factors determining the effects of
targeted employment policies in order to establish what is needed for
partial reforms to become successful, in terms of both cutting unem-
ployment and increasing welfare. We argue that the employment ef-
fects of targeted policies may hinge crucially on the initial state of
the labor market. Thus, for instance, a reduction in firing costs tar-
geted to low-productivity workers in sclerotic labor markets, where
it is easy to find unemployed workers to fill vacancies, raises labor
market tightness by so much that it may end up reducing the low-
skilled unemployment rate without affecting the unemployment rate
of high-skilled workers, which may marginally rise or fall. At the
same time, the wages of both workers increase, because their out-
side option value rises in a tighter labor market. With an increase in
wages and a reduction in unemployment, the welfare of both types of
workers rises, yielding support for such a policy.
In tight labor markets, where it is difficult to find candidates to
fill vacancies, the abovementioned targeted employment policy often
increases the unemployment rate of low-productivity workers, be-
cause the increase in job destruction is larger than the increase in
5. Other papers also use search equilibrium models with worker or job het-
erogeneity to analyze the effects of some employment policies. For instance,
Acemoglu (2001) shows that unemployment benefits and minimum wages may
raise welfare in a model with good and bad jobs in segmented markets. Albrecht
and Vroman (2002) analyze a labor market in which low and high-educated work-
ers can be hired for unskilled jobs while only high-educated workers can perform
skilled jobs, albeit without allowing for on-the-job-search as in Dolado, Jansen,
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job creation, while there is little effect on the unemployment rate of
high-productivity workers. Indeed, the welfare of low-productivity
workers typically falls, while the welfare of high-productivity work-
ers increases. The political support for such a partial reform will de-
pend on the composition of the labor force. If, as is reasonable, there
is a large proportion of unskilled workers in the economy, this kind
of targeted test will not be politically feasible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents
some examples of targeted employment policies, paying particular
attention to employment protection legislation. The focus on employ-
ment protection legislation is justified because in many countries,
not just in Western Europe, provisions such as notice periods, proce-
dures for dismissals, and severance payments often vary across occu-
pations. Moreover, recent reforms to employment protection legislation
have implemented targeted reductions of firing costs, in many occa-
sions through the introduction of atypical contracts, yet only for work-
ers with the worse employment outcomes. Section 2 is devoted to the
empirical literature on targeted employment policies, including both
cross-country and case studies pertaining to specific country experi-
ences, so as to identify the effects of these reforms. Section 3 con-
tains a summary of the theoretical implications derived from a search
equilibrium model addressing the effects of partial reforms on vari-
ous labor-market outcomes, such as unemployment, wages, job real-
location, and welfare. This theoretical discussion highlights two key
issues: the main channels through which targeted employment poli-
cies may affect the labor market outcomes of all population groups,
not only those of the targeted group; and the main factors determin-
ing the sign of the overall effect on unemployment and its distribu-
tion among population groups. Lastly, section 4 concludes.
1. EXAMPLES OF TARGETED EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
The targeted nature of employment policies is quite evident in the
provision of employment incentives and in recent reforms of employ-
ment protection legislation. With regard to the provision of employ-
ment incentives, most countries provide financial incentives—such as
top-up wages, social security contribution rebates, and tax credits—for
hiring workers with some specific characteristics leading to worse
employment outcomes. As for employment protection legislation,
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to allow hiring certain population groups under less strict dismissal
regulations.6
Employment incentives typically target young workers with low
skills. For instance, in Germany employee allowances are aimed at
improving the employment prospects of unemployment assistance re-
cipients, with a strong focus on young persons.7 In Italy, vocational
integration schemes aimed at young people in depressed areas offer
training allowances that are equally financed by the employer and the
provincial employment office. These schemes may be converted into a
training-cum-work-contract entailing reduced social security contribu-
tions. The conversion of these contracts and also of apprenticeship
contracts into permanent ones is encouraged by extending the reduc-
tion of social security contributions for an additional twelve months.8
Tax relief is also offered for job creation, but only when the new em-
ployee is under 25 years of age and has been unemployed for a period
of at least twenty-four months. France targets young people who are
encountering special difficulties in finding work, with a focus on those
aged sixteen to twenty-one without a diploma and those under twenty-
five who do not have a vocational qualification or who abandoned their
studies. These groups are eligible to be hired under so-called orienta-
tion contracts, qualification contracts, and employment-initiative con-
tracts, in which the wages may be set below the minimum wage, the
employer is exempted from social security contributions, and the state
may pay a lump-sum recruitment subsidy. Finally, Spain offers reduc-
tions of social security contributions, which can reach 70 percent, for
employers that grant permanent contracts to unemployed persons under
thirty or over forty-five years of age or to unemployed women regis-
tered as jobseekers for at least one year and recruited in occupations
and activities in which female workers are underrepresented.
Employment protection legislation, in turn, varies significantly not
only across countries, but also within countries, based on firm and
worker characteristics such as firm size, the existence of collective
agreements, job tenure, and workers’ skill and educational levels.9
6. Detailed information about these measures in European Union countries
can be found in European Commission (2003).
7. The allowance is about twelve euros, on top of the wage received from the
employer, for every day the employee worked at least six hours.
8. This rebate is 50 percent in the north of Italy and 100 percent in the south.
9. OECD (1999) presents a detailed and comprehensive description of em-
ployment protection legislation in several countries and its variation by worker
skills, tenure, the existence of collective agreements, and firm size. For a justifica-
tion and the implications of variable enforcement of employment protection legis-
lation by firm size, see Boeri and Jimeno (2005).66 Juan J. Dolado, Marcel Jansen, and Juan F. Jimeno
With regard to skill level, for example, there are two sources of varia-
tion in the enforcement of employment protection legislation. First,
procedural requirements for dismissals, notice periods, and sever-
ance pay provisions for unfair dismissals are usually stricter for white-
collar workers. Second, high-skilled workers are not always entitled
to be hired under atypical employment contracts with less strict em-
ployment protection provisions.
Countries where employment protection provisions are less strict
for blue-collar workers include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Greece, and Italy. In all of these but France, the required notice pe-
riod is shorter for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers,
and in Denmark and Greece, blue-collar workers are entitled to lower
severance pay. Severance pay for unjustified dismissal is also lower
for blue-collar workers in Belgium and Greece.10
Spain provides a paradigmatic case study of partial reforms intro-
ducing atypical employment contracts. Faced with an unemployment
rate above 20 percent in 1984, the Spanish government tried to imple-
ment a significant change in employment protection legislation by
liberalizing temporary contracts in two main respects: their use was
extended to include hiring employees to regular positions (not just to
seasonal or probationary positions); and they entailed much lower
severance payments than the regular permanent contracts. As a re-
sult of this two-tier reform (permanent contracts retained their pre-
vious indemnities for fair and unfair dismissals), the proportion of
temporary employees in total salaried employment surged in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s and stayed above 30 percent (35 percent in 1995)
after 1990. A series of countervailing labor market reforms aimed at
reducing the reform’s incidence were introduced in 1994, 1997, 2001,
and 2002, aimed at providing a less stringent employment protection
legislation for permanent contracts and considerable restrictions on
the use of fixed-term contracts.11 A new permanent contract for new
hires was introduced in 1997. The main novelty was that under this
contract, mandatory firing costs for unfair dismissals were lower than
those pertaining to the old permanent contracts (thirty-three days of
wages per year of seniority with a maximum of twenty-four months’
wages versus forty-five days of wages and forty-two months’ wages,
10. Institutional details of employment protection legislation in these coun-
tries are in OECD (1999). The information in the text refers to the late
1990s.
11. See Dolado, García-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002) for a detailed description
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respectively). Only certain population groups were eligible to be hired
under the new contract, however—namely, young workers (aged eigh-
teen to twenty-nine), long-term unemployed registered at the public
employment office for at least twelve months, unemployed above forty-
five years of age, disabled people, and workers whose contracts were
transformed from temporary into permanent ones. In the 2001 re-
form, the government managed to extend the use of the new contracts
to young workers between sixteen and thirty years of age, long-term
unemployed registered for at least six months, and unemployed women
of any age working in sectors where they were underrepresented.
Spain is not the only country that has liberalized atypical employ-
ment contracts or reduced firing costs contingent on specific workers
characteristics. In 1984, Italy introduced employment promotion con-
tracts (contratti di formazione e lavoro) aimed at promoting the hir-
ing and firm-based training of young workers (aged fifteen to
twenty-nine). Likewise, fixed-term contracts were first introduced in
France in 1979, but their scope was very much reduced by the social-
ist government in 1982. As of a reform in 1990, fixed-term contracts
can be used only for seasonal activities, the replacement of an em-
ployee on leave, temporary increases in activity, and the facilitation
of employment for targeted groups, from the young to the long-term
unemployed (Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
Partial labor market reforms have taken place in many Latin
American countries, sometimes aimed at decreasing firing costs (Co-
lombia and Peru at the end of the 1980s) an others at raising them
(Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and
Panama).12 However, the only country that significantly liberalized
the use of atypical contracts targeted on certain demographic groups
was Argentina, where a reform in 1991 introduced fixed-term con-
tracts and training contracts for young workers. A new reform in
1995 introduced special contracts to promote the employment of popu-
lation groups facing disadvantages in that respect.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF TARGETED
EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
The empirical literature on the labor market effects of labor regu-
lation contains two distinctive streams. First, cross-country studies
12. See IDB (2003).68 Juan J. Dolado, Marcel Jansen, and Juan F. Jimeno
use quantitative or qualitative indicators representing the effect of
those institutions to explain international differences in labor mar-
ket outcomes, such as employment and unemployment rates.13 Within
this stream of the literature, recent studies look at the interactions
between institutions and shocks, as well as the different impacts of
institutions on the labor market outcomes of different population
groups, such as young people and women.14 However, this literature
often considers targeted employment policies or partial labor market
reforms only in the construction of the overall institutional indexes,
and not separately as individual institutional features. As stressed in
this paper, this treatment can be very restrictive since, for instance,
a general reduction of firing costs does not have the same labor mar-
ket effects as a commensurate reduction in the severance payments
of a certain group of workers.
Nevertheless, a few studies estimate the labor market impact of
some targeted employment policies, such as temporary contracts,
separately from aggregate indexes of employment protection legisla-
tion. Among them, Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) find that
less strict regulation of fixed-term employment contracts tends to
reduce youth unemployment rates without any impact on the unem-
ployment rate of prime-age males. In a similar vein, Nunziata and
Staffolani (2001) use an unbalanced panel of nine member countries
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) during the second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s
to estimate the effects of employment protection legislation. They
allow for three types of regulations: employment protection legisla-
tion on firing permanent employees, regulations regarding fixed-term
employees, and regulations on temporary work agencies. They find
that less stringent fixed-term contract regulations have a significant
positive impact on temporary and total employment during upturns,
with no significant effect on total permanent employment. In the case
of young workers (fifteen to twenty-four years of age), less stringent
fixed-term contract regulations increase both temporary and perma-
nent employment. With regard to temporary work agencies, they
find that less stringent regulations have an incremental effect on
13. See Nickell and Layard (1999).
14. On interactions, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). On the differential
impact of labor market institutions across population groups, see Bertola, Blau,
and Kahn (2002), Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002), and Neumark and
Wascher (2003). On the impact of employment protection legislation on employ-
ment adjustment, see Caballero, Engel, and Micco (2003).On the Effects of Targeted Employment Policies 69
temporary employment and total employment, but only during down-
turns. In the case of young workers, however, less stringent regula-
tions for temporary work agencies raise temporary employment while
reducing permanent employment.
The second stream of the literature looks at specific country epi-
sodes to evaluate the effects of labor market reforms through the
analysis of labor market outcomes before and after the reform (that
is, using a differences-in-differences format). Studies of this type in-
clude Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) on the 1997 Spanish re-
form, Blanchard and Landier (2002) on France, and Hopenhayn (2001)
on the Argentine reform. In Spain, Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz
(2003) find that the reduction of firing costs (and payroll taxes) for
young and older workers and the long-term unemployed had a posi-
tive effect on the employment rate of young workers with hardly any
effect on their dismissal rate, whereas it increased both dismissals
and hiring among older workers. Blanchard and Landier (2002), in
turn, look at transitions between temporary and permanent employ-
ment in France. They find an increase in worker turnover since 1983,
especially among younger cohorts, for whom the probability of hold-
ing a fixed-term job increased, the probability of holding a permanent
job decreased, and the probability of becoming unemployed showed
no clear trend. For Argentina, Hopenhayn (2001) also finds that the
introduction of fixed-term contracts had a very strong impact on la-
bor turnover, inducing an increase in hiring accompanied by some
substitution of permanent jobs with temporary jobs.
3. HOW TARGETED EMPLOYMENT POLICIES WORK: SOME
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
As discussed in the introduction, a comprehensive analysis of tar-
geted employment policies ought to start with a consideration of the
existence of worker heterogeneity and imperfect substitution among
workers of different skills to perform a single type of job.15 Worker
heterogeneity is needed to justify differential treatment by targeted
15. This section is based on a companion paper (Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno,
2004) in which we present a full-fledged search model to investigate the effects of
dual employment protection legislation—namely, the reduction of firing costs for
less productive workers—in the spirit of recent partial reforms of employment
protection legislation in many countries.70 Juan J. Dolado, Marcel Jansen, and Juan F. Jimeno
measures. Imperfect substitution is the channel through which mea-
sures affecting only one type of worker impinge on the labor market
outcomes of nontargeted groups.
In principle, the definition of worker heterogeneity must cover
two relevant dimensions. First, different types of workers have dif-
ferent productivity levels. For instance, the distribution of productiv-
ity levels of young and low-skilled workers are bound to lie to the left
of the distribution of productivity levels of older and high-skilled work-
ers.16 Second, the arrival rate of shocks to productivity may also vary
with workers’ characteristics, such as age, educational levels, and
skills. Unskilled workers could be more prone to large and negative
productivity shocks than skilled workers. In standard search equilib-
rium models of the labor market, the population group with the low-
est productivity and the highest arrival rate of productivity shocks
would experience the highest unemployment rate, so that, in prin-
ciple, there is a rationale for introducing employment policies that
target the unskilled group.
Given the distributions of productivity and their evolution over
time, firms would find it optimal to hire workers of each type when
their productivity is above a certain threshold, which depends on
workers’ reservation wage, the shapes of the productivity distribu-
tions, the arrival rate of productivity shocks, overall labor market
tightness, and the skill composition of the unemployed. Similarly,
firms would destroy jobs whose productivity is below a certain thresh-
old, which depends on job termination costs, in addition to the same
determinants of the hiring threshold. Targeted measures typically
aim at lowering the hiring productivity threshold, the firing produc-
tivity threshold, or both, for workers with the worse productivity dis-
tribution. Thus, employment subsidies for less productive workers or
a reduction in their firing costs typically makes it more attractive to
hire this type of worker. Hence, the first direct effect of targeted
employment policies is on the targeted group’s flows in and out of
unemployment.
Yet, the change in one particular group’s unemployment flows
affects overall labor market tightness. Under imperfect substitution
of workers, hiring and firing decisions for the nontargeted group de-
pend on overall labor market tightness. A second effect of targeted
16. In formal terms, the distribution for low-skilled workers is stochastically
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employment policies, therefore, is to change the hiring and firing deci-
sions that affect the nontargeted group. Labor market tightness increases
because firms open more job vacancies when their wage costs drop as a
result of the reduced firing costs of the low-skilled workers. Wages also
rise as a result of workers having a better outside opportunity. The size
of this effect, which is different for the two groups of workers under
consideration (targeted or not), depends on how wages are determined
and on the sensitivity of profits from opening job vacancies to the overall
labor market tightness. In any case, overall labor market tightness rises
while firing and hiring productivity thresholds change for all workers.
Typically, the employment rate of the targeted group would improve
relative to that of the nontargeted group. In the literature on active
labor market policies, the fact that the relative hiring of the two types of
workers changes is called the substitution effect of targeted measures,
which is widely discussed in policy analysis.
However, the theoretical analysis of employment policies pays
less attention to the identification of the main parameters determin-
ing the size and sign of these two effects, the direct effect on the
targeted group and the spillovers on the nontargeted group. Search
and matching models of the labor market, which are currently the
standard toolkit for the analysis of employment polices, typically ig-
nore worker heterogeneity and nonsegmented markets for workers
of different skills, features which we argue are key for a comprehen-
sive account of the effects of targeted employment policies. As sketched
above, this set up includes many parameter values that determine
these effects, and models of this class generally cannot be solved ana-
lytically. One has to resort to simulated results obtained from appro-
priately calibrated models.
To more precisely illustrate the nature of the interactions in-
volved in the analysis of targeted employment policies, we now ex-
amine the reduction of firing costs for low-skilled workers when
severance payments before the reform are identical for the two types
of workers.17 We first assume that the labor market initially is very
sclerotic, so unemployment rates for all workers are high (but much
higher for low-skilled workers) and overall labor market tightness is
low, namely, it is easy to find candidates for unfilled new vacancies.
Lowering the firing cost would increase job reallocation and, there-
fore, tightness. This leads to a reduction of the unemployment rate of
17. For equations and simulations of this kind of model, see Dolado, Jansen,
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the targeted group, as the direct effect on job creation should domi-
nate the effects of increasing tightness on the expected profits from
opening job vacancies. The flow out of unemployment for nontargeted
workers is low, as more workers of the targeted group are hired, and
the unemployment rate of nontargeted group is thus likely to rise
initially. However, given that firms find it easy to locate candidates
for their vacancies, job creation will spill over to the nontargeted
sector, so the steady-state unemployment rate of high-productivity
workers hardly changes or may even fall if the matching process be-
tween workers and vacancies is sufficiently efficient. Further, the
higher labor market tightness causes an increase in wages for both
workers because of their higher reservation wages. With an increase
in wages and a reduction in unemployment, the welfare of both types
of workers rises, yielding overall support to such a policy.18
The process works differently in tight labor markets, where it is
difficult to find candidates to fill vacancies. The targeted employment
policy described above often increases the unemployment rate of low-
productivity workers because the increase in turnover dominates the
increase in job creation, with little effect on the unemployment rate of
high-productivity workers. More precisely, the reduction in firing costs
leads to an increase in layoffs of low-skilled workers, but the increase
in efficiency translates into fewer additional jobs because the matching
rates are relatively insensitive to changes in labor market tightness
when the labor market is already tight. Indeed, the welfare of low-
productivity workers typically falls, while the welfare of high-produc-
tivity workers increases. The political support for such a partial reform
depends on the number of winners and losers, which is determined by
the composition of the labor force. Summing up, the intuition behind
this differential effect arises from the sensitivity of job creation to the
increase in firms’ profits from filling jobs with low-productivity work-
ers. Jobs are filled relatively fast in a sclerotic labor market. Any change
in the expected profits from hiring a low-productivity worker will there-
fore translate into a strong increase in job creation and in the number
of matches, leading to lower unemployment. By contrast, vacancies
18. As shown by Ljungqvist (2002), the employment effects of firing costs
depend crucially on how wages are determined. When firing costs are assumed to
reduce the firm’s threat point in the initial match, firing costs tend to increase
equilibrium unemployment, whereas they tend to increase employment when the
worker’s relative share of match surplus is assumed to stay constant when sever-
ance pay is varied. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) propose alternative specifica-
tions of the bargaining process in which the workers extract rents from firing
costs in continuing matches but not in the first match, as in the bonding scheme.On the Effects of Targeted Employment Policies 73
remain unfilled for a long time in a tight labor market. Changes in
the profits of filled jobs thus have a smaller effect on job creation
than on job destruction, leading to a rise in unemployment. The theo-
retical predictions of our model also point out that the case of a higher
elasticity of the matching rate of workers with respect to labor mar-
ket tightness—which is an indicator of the speed at which workers
find jobs—combined with a higher incidence of productivity shocks
on low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers strengthens
our previous conclusions regarding the differential effects of targeted
policies in sclerotic and tight labor markets.
The fact that the effects of targeted employment policies may
vary across the two types of workers depending on the initial state of
the labor market is obviously very relevant for their analysis from a
political-economy perspective. In particular, the targeted group will
not always gain from a partial reform. The political feasibility of this
type of partial reforms depends crucially on the initial state of the
labor market (sclerotic or tight), the composition of the labor force,
the relative incidence of productivity shocks across workers, and the
efficiency of the matching process in a frictional labor market.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
One relevant feature of employment policies and labor market re-
forms is that they are very often targeted at specific demographic groups,
normally those with difficulties in finding jobs (for example, youth,
women, and the long-term unemployed). Some empirical studies that
estimate the effects of this type of policy conclude that the impact on
the labor market outcomes for different population groups can vary
widely and do not always go in the same direction.
In this paper, we have argued that more analysis of these policies
using search equilibrium models of the labor market with worker het-
erogeneity is needed. We have conjectured that the effects of targeted
employment policies may depend on the state of the labor market (the
degree of tightness). An interesting outcome of our analysis is that
support for partial reforms is likely to be greater in sclerotic labor
markets than in tight ones, since the welfare of all workers increases
in the former. This issue is relevant to the debate in the literature on
the optimal timing of reforms (see, for example, Saint-Paul, 1996). It is
often argued that reductions in firing costs should be undertaken dur-
ing expansions rather than recessions, but Saint-Paul (1996) presents74 Juan J. Dolado, Marcel Jansen, and Juan F. Jimeno
compelling evidence that the opposite happens in practice. To the ex-
tent that a sclerotic labor market corresponds to bad times and a
tight labor market to good times, the above discussion provides a
rationale for that seemingly suboptimal practice in frictional labor
markets where it is costly to match workers and vacancies.
It is illustrative to compare the effects of a partial reduction of
firing costs for a targeted group, as considered above, to a compre-
hensive reform that delivers a commensurate reduction of firing costs
for all workers (skilled and nonskilled). In the latter case, the direct
effect on hiring and firing is smaller for low-skilled workers (since
the reduction of their firing costs is smaller) and larger for high-skilled
workers. Since, initially, the unemployment rate of low-skilled work-
ers is bound to be higher than the unemployment rate of high-skilled
workers, the comprehensive reform is likely to have a smaller im-
pact on flows in and out of unemployment than would a targeted
reform. The direct effect on overall labor market tightness is thus
lower under the comprehensive reform, and the overall reduction in
equilibrium unemployment is also likely to be lower. In any case, our
discussion provides clear reasons to believe, first, that the effects of a
targeted reform on overall equilibrium unemployment and the inci-
dence of unemployment across population groups are different from
those of a commensurate reform and, second, that in both cases, these
effects may change depending on the initial state of the labor market.
This calls for more theoretical and empirical analysis to achieve a
better assessment of the balance between these two types of labor
market reforms.On the Effects of Targeted Employment Policies 75
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